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The  theoretical  foundatica  for  this paper  ha.,, been laid in  13].  One of the  premises of the 
theory there exposed,  is that  every individual can  evaluate his welfare position with respect to 
his income level on a bounded scale. A description of this evaluation may be given by the indivi- 
dual welfare function of income. O le of the outcomes of tile theory is that under fairly general 
assumptions  the  individual  welfa, e.  function  will  tend  to  a  lognormal  di;tribution  function 
A(.; ~, o). 
in [41  this has been tested empirically, making use.  :  ,:~umer survey of the Belgian Con- 
sumer Union.  The  thesis was supported  by the empt~  :  .,its, while ~ and a  proved to be in- 
dividually  determined.  Moreover,  the  value  of v  could  be  largely  explained  by  inc,)me  and 
family size. The first dependency, that the welfare function shifts to the right with an increase of 
income, has been called preference drift. 
In this paper we estimated the welfare  function of income on  the basis of a  survey by the 
Consumer  Union  in The  Netherlands.  Besides yielding further  evidence on  the  Belgian results, 
we  handled  a  much  finer social differentiation; accordingly, we  could  measure  the  preference 
drift  and  the influence of the family si~,e on  individual welfare  for much  finer specified social 
subgroups. 
Finally, we compared our new results for  the  Dutch survey with  the  results of the Belgian 
survey on which we reported in this journal in  ! 97 ~. 
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I. introduct~on 
The individual  welfare  function of income is a concept which was in- 
troduced  in  [3l,  and  which  bears  a  superficial  similarity  to  the  old- 
fashioned cardinal  utility function of income. We do not wish to spend 
a  lot  of  space  here  to  point out  the differences between our concept 
and  the  Edgeworthian concept: instead, we refer to the aforementioned 
monograph for a  theoretical  foundation  or to our earlier article  in  the 
Sprhtg  1971  issue of this journal.  At this place we  restrict ourselves to 
the  following short (and admittedly superficial)  introduction.  Let y  be 
the  level  o!  the  individual's  annual  income, which  is assumed to be a 
constant stream over time: then  this level is evaluated by the individual 
on some scale in  terms of "bad",  "insufficient",  "sufficient",  "good", 
etc. Actually, the individual is evaluating his income in comparison with 
a  worst  income  level,  assumed  to  be  zero,  and  a  best  income  level, 
"equal to" oo. This may very well be on a numerical scale. Denoting the 
evaluation of income level y  by U(y), it is not unnatural to evaluate the 
worst income level y  =  0  by  U(0) =  0, and  the best level by U(~)=  I. 
This  is  also the way  in which for instance students are  evaluated: also 
then evaluations "'good",  "'bad", etc.  are  translated  into numbers 9n a 
finite  scale,  it  is not really necessary to situate the interval scale on [0, 
!].  it  may  as  well  be  [0,  10],  or  any other finite  interval.  It is only 
essential  that it should be  bounded,  reflecting th~ psychological reality 
that  every  individual  is  evaluating  his  income  by comparing it w!  ;~ a 
worst position  and  a  position of complete satiation vlthough any finite 
amount of money may not sufFce to create such a situation. Assuming 
that U(y) has the interval [0,  I ] as its range, the typical shape of U(y) is 
expected to'be as sketched in fig.  I ; we call U(y) the individual welfare 
function of income. For the theory and philosophy behind this concept 
we refer to [3], but we want to state here one thing: the individual wel- 
fare  funt.~ion  of income does not measure any objectively  measurable 
property of inco.ne  but only the relative welfare as perceived by the in- 
dividual: it is measured as a  proportion between welfare obtained com. 
pared  to th~ optimal imaginable situation. It is determined up to a posi- 
tive linear transformation. (In [ 3 ]  it is called a neo-cardinal concept for 
reasons which be'come clear, if the concept is embedded in a world of a 
varying  number of commodities.) In  [3]  it i~ shown that under fairly 
general conditions U~y) will be an approximately lognorma! distribution 
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Fig. 1. Individual welfare function of income. 
U(y) = A(y; U, o) = .... 
!  In(y) 
f 
exp( -~-(t- k:) 2/o 2) dt. 
The  values  of  the  parameters #  and o  are individually determined.  So 
the  welfare  function  of income is individual,  although it obeys always 
to an approximately lognormal specification. 
In  [4]  a  first attempt was  made  to verify  the operationality  of this 
theory and to estimate the welfare function of a number of individuals. 
More specifically, on  the  basis of a  survey among about  3000 mem- 
bers of t!le Belgian Consumer Union, the following conclusions could be 
drawn: 
(a) the individual's welfare function can be estimated; 
(b) the shape appeared to be apl;.~roximately lognormal;  ': 
(c) the parameters # and o appeared to be quite stable. 
There was a  definite  relationship between/a  and  the individual income 
and  family size.  On the other hand o could not be shown to depend on 
individual income and family size. 
In  this  paper  we  shall  continue  the  analysis  and  consider  a  sur- 
vey  among  members  of  the  Dutch  consumer  union.  At first  we shall 
look for confirmation on  the  observability of the  welfare  function,  its 
lognormality and  the estimation  of the  parameters on  the  basis of this 
new survey.  The  main part  of this paper, however, will be devoted to a 
closer  analysis  of  /a  and  o  and  their  determinants.  Since  the  recent 
survey  is much more informative  than  the previous one with respect to 
the sociological characteristics of the sample, we are able to provide for 
a  better  explanation  of/a  and  o.  Finally, we  compare  the  Dutch  and 
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2. The estimation unethod 
Although  we might  refer to  141,  we think the reader will prefer that 
we repeat here  in  short  the  method  we employed  to estimate  the  wel- 
fare function in Belgium. 
The  income  concept  the individual has in mind is net  income.Actual- 
ly,  the  function  UO') = AO,: ta. o) can be estimated if we have at hand a 
number  of observations  of the  type  { Yi.  U(Yi))7=l,  through  which  we 
can  fit  a  curve  of the  Iognc, rmai  family.  However, the difficulty is that 
we cannot  provide  the  individual  with  a  series of income levels and ask 
him straightaway how he evalua:es these levels on a zero-one scale. The 
individual  does  not  have  the  habit  to  evaluate  in  such a way.  A second 
problem  is that  we would  have  to  rely  in  an  anonymous questionnaire 
.  n  say  800,  1000,  1200,  ..  2000  guilders per  on  a  fixed  series  ()i)i=l  .. 
month.  For  some  people  these  income  levels  may  be  really  different 
with  respect  to evaluation,  but for other people, say the rich, there will 
be  no  real  difference  between  these  levels,  all  being very  insufficient. 
The same holds for ,he poor man, who cannot make any differentiation 
between  1800 and  2000 except that both are royal income levels. 
in  this  paper  we shall  employ  an  indirect  method  developed  in  14] 
which already proved to be successful,  it is based on the ibl!owing qctes- 
tion. where we quote a typical answer (in  Roman). 
Taking into account your own situation with respect to family and job you would call your net- 
income {including fringe benefits at' ~ with substractlon of social security premmms)* 
we.-k  A 
per  month  B 



















were above  f  45,000 
were between  f  35.000 and 45,000 
were between  f  30.000 and 35,000 
were between  f  25,000 and 30.000 
were between  f  22,000 and 25,000 
were between  f  20,000 and 22,000 
were between  f  17,000 and 20,000 
were between  f  I ,.  "~,v,,,,n'm and  17,000 
were below  J  i 2.000 
* Fncircle your reference period. 
In  this  way  the  individual  furnishes us a division of the income range 
into  income  brackets {Yl, Y2 ], O'2. Y3 ] .... , ¢.!'n..vn +! ~ where .r 1 = 0  and RM.S.  van D'aag,  A.  Kapteyn,  lndividuM  welfare ]Unction  of income  37 
Yn+!  = ~*" Tile  division  differs  from  individual  to  individual  and  it  is 
certain  that  the  division is not ~ven by the individual in a random way. 
There  seems to  be  a  general  principle  behind  the  fact,  that  always  the 
extreme brackets are wider than the brackets in the middle. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the indivklual  tries to inform us 
as exactly  as  possible  about  his welfare  function.  He attempts to maxi- 
mize  the  information  value  of kis answer.  Can  we  define  the  informa- 
tion vMue  more  sharply? 
Let  us  consid!er  the  above  answer.  The  welfare  evaluation  of an  in- 
come  in  the  brackets (25.  301,  labelled  "sufficient",  is on  the  average 
I  ~1U(25)  +  U(30)I  =  U(y  6) 
by  which equation )~6  is defined. 
However,  we  cannot  say  that  any  income  leve  t,  in  (25,  30]  is eva- 
luated  by  U076). The average inaccuracy  of this evaluation may be mea- 
sured by 
30 
f  lUCy)- U(Y6)l 2 dU(y). 
25 
When  we  have  a partition  [0, Y2 ],, (Y2, Y3 ],  .... (Yn, oo) the total average 
inaccuracy  of this partition is by definition 
n  Yi+ I 
r,f 
i=!  Yi 
I U(y)-- U(Yi)] 2 dU(y).  ('t) 
Now it is evident  that  the  separate  integrals  increase with the variation 
of the U-function on (Yi,)'i+ I ]  and the interval length (Yi+  1 -  Yi).  Hence 
the individual selects narrow brackets where the/./-function  is steep, and 
wide  brackets  where  it increases slowly.  Mathematically, the individual 
attempts to choose the yi-values in such a way that ( 1  ) is minimized.Ap- 
plying the  "integral  transformation"  z  =  U(y)  we replace minimization 
of (I) by the problem 
n  zi4  I 
f  t  -]2dz '  min  ~  ~[z .... z i 
z l ..... z n  i'- 1  zi 
(2) 
where 
~(z,,  +  zi÷ 1 )"  z i=U(y i)  and  ~.= 
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n 
min  ~  ~  (zi+ 1 --zi)3" 
z2 ..... Zn  i= ~ 
Setting Pi = zi+l .....  z i we have zini Pi =  1. So the problem reduces to 
subject to 
n 
min  ~  l'3i, 
Pl ..... Pn  i= I 
n 
 pi=  I. 
i=l 
The solution is Pi = ( I/n) which implies z i = ( i .... i )/n and 
i-I 
U(yi)  -  tl 
(3) 
in  words,  the  result  can  be stated as:  the  individual partitions  the  in- 
come  range  according  to  equal percentiles  of the  welfare functi!on.  In 
the actual  situation our question leaves room for nine brackets, so Yi is 
the (i -  i)st  I I. l%-quantile of the distribution defined by the distribu- 
tion function U. 
We observe  that the definition of the average inaccuracy by (l) con- 
tains an  element of arbitrariness,  but  fortunately any  other reasonable 
criterion  yields the same solution Pi = ( I In). We refer to [ 3 ]  for a more 
detailed analysis.  Secondly, it may be asked whether we observe by this 
method points of the individual welfare function or something else. Al- 
though  it  cannot  be  proved  in  an  objective  way,  we  believe that our 
point  estimates  present  an  empirical reflection of the theoretical ,con- 
cept of an  individual welfare function.  Actually, the concept is empiri- 
cally  stamped  by repeated  measurement.  In the same way  the concept 
of clock-time  acquired  its significance  in the Middle Ages; in  the same 
way  temperature  as a  measurable concept,  was empirically stamped  in 
the  l 8th century, and in our century the still less visualizable concept of 
I.Q. got its significance for a considerable part of the population. 
After  this  not  unimportant  sideline  we  come  back  to  pursue  the 
analysis.  By  the  method described  we  have foand  for the  individual a 
series of points (Yi.  U(Yi)} 9-2, which have to be on the graph of his wel- 
fare  function.  The question  is whether the assumption,  that the indivi- 
dual  welfare  function  is  lognormal,  is  plausible and  how  we  may esti- 
mate  the  parameters/a and o. We solve this question essentially b3, mak- B.M.S.  van Praag, A.  Kapteyn, Individual wel[are .?imction of income  39 
ing a scatter of the points on lognormal  paper, where the horizontal axis 
has a logarithmic scale and the vertical axis performs the transformation 
X = N-l(.; 0,  I)  where  N(.; 0,  I)  is  the  standard-normal  distribution 
function.  If the  points (yi,  U(y t)  9=2)were  points of the graph of a dis- 
tribution function A(y; It, 0), there would strictly hold 
U(y i) =  N(In(yi);it,  o)=  N  "  :0,  1  . 
We know that the logarithms of the yi's quoted are  11. l%-quantiles,  say, 
u 2, ..., u 9  of the normal distribution, hence there has to hold 
In(Yi)-It 
0  = ui' 
or 
In(y/) = ou i + It.  (4) 
It stands to reason that the individual answers will not satisfy (4)strictly, 
but we may assume that (4) holds approximately; we estimate It, o  from 
the linear model 
In(y/) = ou i  + It + e i ,  (5) 
where e i  is the  random  disturbance  term.  We assume  that  al'i e~  are  in- 
dependently distributed with equal variance and expectation ze~ro. 
Applying ordinary  regressie"  on  the eight observations (J'i.  ui)from 
the questionnaire we get estimates for It and o. If the individual has not 
inserted  all  answers  but has forgotten,  say,  the  first  and  the  third,  we 
have  still  six  observations  (Y3, u3), (Y5,  Us), ..-, (y9,  u9) on  which we 
may  apply  the  regression.  Only  the  two-point  answers  are  excluded, 
since a regression would be trivial in that case. 
3. Social classifications of the material 
The  members  of  the  Consumer  Union  in  The  Netherlands.  at  the 
sampling  datc  numbering  over  300,000  members,  receive  a  monthly 
journal  with  consumer info;mation, tests, and so on. The October  1971 
issue included an 8-page questionnaire, which was to be answered by the 
member, and to be sent anonymously to the Consumer Union as a letter 
for which  the  respondent  had  to pay  a stamp. Answering the question- 
naire  took  about  an  hour and a half. The questionnaire contained ques- 40  B.M.S. van Praag. A. Kapteyn. Individual welfare function of income 
ttions about the attitude of the respondent towards the Union, his con- 
sumer ~havior and more specifically his purchase p!ans of durables, and 
finally a  set of questions about his social  background  and  the very un- 
usual question about income evaluation quoted in the previous section. 
Although the conditions looked unfavorable, the response was rather 
large.  ~bout  15.000  members  took  the pains to answer the questions 
and  mostly this was done in a very accurate way.  About half of them 
answered  the most difficult questions, those with respect to the income 
evaluation.  Undoubtedly,  this  good  result  is  due  to the very good re- 
putation  of the Union among its members. 
We chose 6186 questionnaires at  random for detailed inspection. We 
might  pose the question what  the sample represents.  Net very. much is 
known  of the membership of the Consumer Union from other sources. 
investigations in  which  the answers of the comple ,e questionnaire were 
compared  to  other  scarce  information,  indicate  that  the  sample  is at 
least representative for the Union, except for the characteristic that the 
respondents filled in the questionnaire and the non-respondents did not. 
This seems to have an effect in such a way, that higher educated people 
tend to be over-represented. Nevertheless, even if the sample  were not 
repre:,,mtative for the Union or the Dutch population, it is still informa- 
tive for our investigations about the individual welfare ,"unction. 
Our  main  subject  will  be  the  estimation  of the  !ndividual  welfare 
function as described in section 2 and the explanation of the parameter 
values by objectively observable variables. 
We consider the following characteristics: 
( A ) The annual net income of the individual  Since the questionnaire was 
anonymous, the respon,~e to this question was rather high. Actually the 
income could be specified per week, per month or per year so that every 
respondent could answer in the unit he is most used to. The concept of 
net  ir :ome itself, although rather understandabl~described,  of course 
causes  some  interpretation  differences among  the  respondents.  How- 
~.wer,  it  does not seem  fatal  for the estimation of parameters and rela- 
tionships.  We  think  that the respondents mainly list their "pc  nanent 
net-income'" which also serve~ as a basis for their income percept,~,~ and 
evaluation. Annual  income in guilders has been tabulated afterwards in 
six  brackets,  namely  [0-80001,  (8000-120001,  (12000-18000], 
(18000-260001,  (26000-369001,  (36000,  **)1. 
(BJ  The  family  size.  That  is  the  number  of  dependents  on  the  re- 
spondent. 
(C)  The principal breadwmner of the faro, 'v.  Mainly this is the ma~  but 
sometimes it  may  be the wile {especially if divorced), or a third person. B. M.S.  van Praag, A. Kapteyn  lndh4dual welfare filnction of income  41 
(D)  The a~tivities of the spouse of the breadwinner,  in  most  ca~c~ the 
husband  is  the  breadwinner,  but  sometimes it  is  the  wife.  For simpli- 
city we shall assume in our textual representation tha~I the husbar~d is al- 
ways  the  breadwinner,  excusing  ourselves  to  the  feminist  reader "qui 
mal y pense". We asked whether the w.~'e of a husband-breadwinner also 
has a  paid full-time job, a part-time job, has a job incidentally or no job 
at all. 
(E)  The level of education of both parents.  We observe that the Dutch 
educational  system  can  be  classified  more  or  less  according  to  two 
characteristics,  namely,  with  respect  to  level  and  nature  (vocational 
versus general) of education.  So we get the  following table  in order of 
increasing level" 
general  vocational 
primary education  (1) 
ext. primary education (2) 
seconda~ education  (4) 
primary vocational education  (3) 
secondary vocational educ.  (5) 
higher vocational education  (6) 
university education (7) 
The  figures  between  brackets  indicate  the  order  used  in  the  specific 
question;  they  will be  used  afterwards.  Actually,  we  assume(  the re- 
spondents to have a university degree if they bad passed their first exa- 
mination,  so  we  have  a  number of university students a', respondents 
with university ,~ducation. 
(F) Working environment.  We distinguish between 
civil service  ( i )  . 
non-profit orgardsation  (2) 
private enterprise  (3) 
independent  (4) 
not working  (5) 
(G)Job classification.  We dinstingu]sh between 
unskilled labor  ( I) 
skilled labor  (2) 
administrative personnel  (3) 
lower and middle executives  (4) 
non-civic army and police personnel  (5) 
instructors, teachers, professors, etc.  (6) 
secondary and higher profe~sional experts  (7) 
the professions and higher personnel  (8) 
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commerical professions (saiesman, etc. )  (9) 
agrarians  (10) 
retired  ( 11 ) 
without profession (housewife, student)  (12) 
temporarily unemployed  ( ! 3) 
4. The individual welfare function and determinants 
The first objective of this article is to gather more evidence on the in- 
dividual  welfare  function  and  its  lognormality. In that respect we are 
satisfied. 
We are interested in  those  people who state their income and answer 
the difficult  "income evaluation question  (see section 2). So we could 
select  3201  questionnaires  out  of the  randomly  chosen subsample of 
6186 members. Punching errors urged us to eliminate 85 ob~Ivations; 
finally we eliminated the respondents, who did not specify their family 
composition.  Our  final  subsample  consisted  of 3010  observations.  It 
will be noticed that most tables add up to a smaller number of ob,~rva- 
tions since not every respo~dent filled in every relevant question. 
1he  majority;  of  the  respondents  answered  the  income  evaluation 
qu'.~stion  completely; we included in our sample every answer, in which 
at least,three  different income levels were sw.cified. 
We niight think  that education has something to do with the ability 
to answer the evaluation question. In table  I we present the distribution 
of 3,  4,  5, 6,  7 and 8-level answers for the different education groups 
(characteristic E).  In the last row we compare the numbers of the dif- 
ferent education groups in the subsample of 3201  observations with the 
total  sample  of 6186  observations.  We  conc,ude that there  is a slight 
bias in  favor of the higher educated groups.  However, the bias is by no 
means dramatic. Apparently, each group is able to answer our ' difficult 
income question". 
According to the method described in section 2  we estimated the/~ 
and  o  of  3010 individuals.  Moreover we estimated for each individual 
the  evaluation  of his welfare position by  "filling in" the income men- 
tioned into his own  welfare function.  Let the ith individual have a wel- 
fare  function A(.; #i, oi),  then we have estimated #i, oi and A(.; #i, °i). 
Before we consider those estimates a  few werds about the goodness of 
fit.  The goodness of fit can be measured by various coefficients; among 
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deviations of the regression coefficients. The average non-squa,ed corre-- 
lation coefficient  of the  3201  measurements is equal  to 0.97. 'The esti- 
mated standard  deviations of the estimates of/a  and  estimates of o are 
on  the average equal  to 0.04 and  0.05. Compared to the average values 
of/a and  o,  9.55  and  0.54  this amounts to about 0.4% and  10% respcc- 
tively. 
However,  the  level  of g  depends  on  the  chosen  money  unit,  so  it 
seems  more  appropriate  to compare the estimated standard  deviations 
of  the  individual  regression  coefficients  with  the variation  of  the esti- 
mated coefficients within the sample. We find a descriptive  sample stan- 
dard deviation qf 0.49 for/a and a sample standard deviation of 0.25  for 
o.  We conclude  therefore  that  the main part ot the variation of the co- 
efficients  within  the  sample  is  due  to  systematic differences  between 
people and  only a smatl part of it may be ascribed to el rors of measure- 
ment. 
Apart  from  the goodness of fit, we are  concerned with the  form of 
the relation (5),  which should be linear in our view. !f the estimated re- 
lation is non-linear in  the independent variables, one might expect that 
the disturbances would  follow a  definite  pattern  around  the regression 
line  instead  of  being  scattered  unsystematically.  In  other  words,  we 
would expect that the disturbances are correlated in some way. We con- 
sidered  the possibility of auto-correlated  disturbances, i.e., we assumed 
an auto-regressive scheme of the disturbances of the type 
ei =  {~'i-!  +  6i, 
where  the 6,  are random with constant variance and expectation zero. 
We estimated p by the formula 
"-"n 
2,t-- 2  6t~t_ 1 
p  9 
Zt  =  2  2  Ct-I 
where n  is the number of specified  income levcE and  e t  is the ith est!- 
mated disturbance.  The avelage of all  the estimates of/;, in  the sample 
appeared  to  be equal  to 0.03,  where the standard deviation of the esti- 
mated auto-correlation  coefficients within  the sample equals 0.36. This 
provides an additional argument in favor of the lognormality of the wel- 
fare  function.  Moreover, it indicates that on  the average our estimates 
of  the  star~dard  deviations  of  the regression  coefficients are  unbiased. 
Now let us consider the results with respect to tlleir economic si~nifi- B.M.S.  van Praag, A.  Aapteyn,  Individual wel[~re function of income  45 
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Fig.  2. The iognormal distribution function [or different parametervalues. (a) Distribution func- 
tions for u  = 0. 0.5,  1.0. (b) Distribution functions for o ~ = O. 1, 0.5.  2.0. 
cance.  In  figs.  2a  and 2b we have sketched welfare functions for several 
values of At and o.  From these figures we already get an idea of the signi- 
cance  of changes in At and  o. Before we consider the tables, let us inter- 
pret  the  differences  in At and o  in a more analytic way. Consider two in- 
dividuals with equal o  but different At, say At1  and At2- The fir'st has a  net 
income Yl.  Which  income Y2  needs the other to enjoy the same welfare 
level?  l 
The welfare level of the first individual is 
AO'l ; Atl, o) =  A(y~ e -u~ , 0, 0). 
The second one enjoys a level 
A(Y2; At  2, o)= A(Y2e-m; 0, o). 
In order that  both enjoy  the same welfare  level,  either person  measuring 
on his own welfare scale, there has to hold: 
Y2  = Yl eU2-m  "~ Yl ( 1 + (At2 -  Atl )). 
The  approximation  is  only  valid  if  At2  -Atl  is  small.  For  instance,  if 
u2-At I  =  0. 1 it  would mean that the second per~,;on needs  1~  more in- 
come  than  the  first  to  be  at  the  same  welfare  level.  We  call  eU  the 
natural unit (of income). 
Differences  with  respect  to  o  are  interpreted  in  the  same  way.  Let 
both have equal B but different o ! and o z. The first welfare level is 
-"  t  A(yl;ts, o j) =  IV  ; O,  I  . 
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The second person is at a level 
(in(Y2)-/a  ;O,  I). 
A(v2; #, 02) = N  02 
Hence,  if  both  individuals  enjoy  the  same  welfare  level,  there  has to 
hold 
oz/o~  .  exp[#(  1  -  0 2/o  I)]  Y2  =  Yl 
The ratio o2/o~  "  can  be  interpreted as an elasticity. Ifyl  increases with 
I%, .V  2 has to increase by o 2/o 1% in order to give the second individual 
the same welfare  increase.  Wc call  0 the individual's welfare sensitivity. 
Finally,  let/~l  #: #2  and o i  ~  02; then  the income levels Yl  and Y2 
are equivalent with respect to their respective welfare evaluation if 
Y2  = Yl °21°~ "exp(#2-#l, °2/01)" 
Having estimated the parameters I,t  i, o i  for the ith individual, it is tempt- 
ing to. consider A(yi;/~i,oi), that is, the individual's evaluation of his own 
actval  welfare position.  Moreover, we are interested in the variation of 
the  welfare evaluation over different individuals in  the subgroups con- 
sidered.  In order to get an idea, we give in fig. 3 the frequency distribu- 
tion of A(yi; #i,  °i) over the  [0,  I 1 interval, corresponding to the sub- 
group with higher vocational education.  For simplicity we characterize 
these  frequency  distributions  by  their respective  means  and  standard 
deviations. The means have been tabulated. 
This should not be understood as impl~'ing that the sum total of the 
individual  welfare  evaluations  equals the total welfare o$ the group in 
the  best  utilitarian  tradition  of interpersonal  utility  comparison.  The 
mean is only used as a rough indication of the location of the frequency 
distribution of welfare evaluations. 
We present the most interesting results i,  tables  2 and 3. 4  A cell of 
table 2 reads as follows: 
The  North-West  element  is  the  mean  of the  welfare  eva!uations  A 
in  the  corresponding subgroup.  The North-East element is the average 
value  of #.  The  South-East element is the average value of o, and the 
South-West  element  represents  the  number  of observations  n.  If n  is 
smaller than  10, we omit the results. 
4  More extensive  tables  ot  the  remits are  available on request  from the Economic  Instill  ~.. B.MS.  van Praag, A.  Kapteyn, Individual welfare fuJwtion of income  47 
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Fig. 3. Frequency distribution of we[,are evaluations of people with higher vocat;onai education. 
We tabulated the results for a number of other two-dimensional sub- 
divisions,  but  we saw always the same influence of the  income charac- 
teristic.  Hence  we  present  in  table  3 oaly the  mar~.jnal  figures,  corre- 
sponding to several one-dimensional subclassifications. 
Conside:ation  of  table  2  leads  to some interesting propositions.  At 
first  we  see  that  the values of ta are  found  to  be around  9.5,  but  that 
their  variation  is  considerable.  There  is  a  definite  dependency  of/a 
on  income,  which  will  be  analyzed  in  the  following section.  In  this 
section  we  shall  concentrate ourselves on  the  "vertical" differences in 
table  2. 
4.1.  The natural unit 
Table  2 shows that  the  natural  unit of couples where  both  partners 
work,  is  in  each  income  group  smaller than  that  of couples with  the 
same income where only  the husband had a  paid job.  The explanation 
is, that the reference group of working couples is a lower class than their 
income would indicate. The inbermediate groups yieltd mainly a value of 
~u in between. 
it  seems that education has some influence on the natural unit, albeit 
probably indirectly  because education and  income are positively corre- 






r" l  "" 
"..) 
k,, 
o.~.  ('~1 
i  - 
X 
0~  r--  ,'J"  ~  v')  0~ 
~  ,,.'~  r..  r~  0~  --  r..- r.. 
~.  ~  ~  v'~  I-.. ,.~  ~  ~. 
r-.  r.-  o~  r... 
v';  ~j.  ,..,  0~ 
! 
~.,  f-.| 
r~ 
~  ~.  "--  ~  "I"  --"  ~  .--  0~  ~ 
~'~ ~r  ~  ~'~  ~  ~  r~  ~'~  ~ 
# 
!  '4".. 
~  m 
•  --  rl 
I  ~  ,--  ,--  ,-. 
¢,w~  m 
I'.... 
m 
1  I 
~D  I  ~ 
r ~  ~  p~ 
ecb  o~  O'~O~  I~  ,-~  rt  ~  ~1'~  ¢.¢~r  ~. 
OO  t'~  ~  ~  r ~-.  r'-. 




•  --,  ¢--i 
.,~,  .N,  I.~ 
~  ~  --- 
o~ 
oo 
.d B.M.S.  van P, ~ag. A.  Jgaptevn,  Individual welfare function ,!q incorne  49 
Table  3 
Welfare characteristics in some social classes. 
Working environment  n  /~  o  A 
Civil service  955  9.59  0.52  0.65 
Non-profit organi~tion  463  9.57  0.50  0.66 
Private enterprise  i 282  9.55  0.50  0.65 
Independent  130  9.62  0.61  0.66 
Not working  136  9.29  0.55  0.57 
Total 
Labor type 
2966  9.55  0.54  0.61 
Unskilled labor  I I  9.04  0.42 
Skilled liabor  140  9.26  (i).45, 
Adinini~trative  personnel  294  9.35  (~.49 
Lower ~nd m;ddle executives  399  9.55  0.48 
No,a-civic army/police, personnel  112  9.55  0.48 
Instructors, teachers, etc.  424  o 61  0.53 
Professional  experts  915  9.56  0.51 
The professions  362  9.89  0.58 
Remaining commercial professiov.s  ! 28  9.51  0.57 
A~arians  15  9.54  0.58 
Retired  54  9.65  0.49 
Without profession  I 18  9.14  0.56 













Total  2981  9.55  0.54  0.61 
to have  a  higher tt.  Apparently  the  natural  unit  is not only determined 
by one's own income, but by the average group income as well. 
4.2,  The welfare sensitivity 
With respect  to  the  wife's activities we observe that the less activities 
in a paid job the wife has, the less the respondent's welfare sensitivity  is. 
A  possible  explanation  might  be  that  the  wife  started  working just be- 
cause  welfare  sensitivity  was  high,  or  that  the  wife's  outside  activities 
have extended the opportunities of spending money. 
The  clearest  pattern  occurs  when  we  look  at  the  education  groups. 
Recalling  the  fact  that  o  has something  to do  with  the  imagination  to 
spend  money,  this would  indicate  a  relation  between  o  and educati~on. 
This appears  to  be  true.  Analyzing  the columns  of table  2, we see that 
primary  education  (1)  yields  the  smallest  o. Then we get primary voca- 
tional  education  (3),  followed  by  extended  primary  vocational  educa- 
tion  (2),  which  yields  almost  the  same  o-value  as secondary  vocational 50  B.M.S. van Praag. A. Kapteyn. Individual welfare function of income 
education  (5).  In  the  same  way  secondary  education  (4)  and  higher 
vocational  education  (6)  yield  the  same  o-value.  Finally,  university 
education  yields  the  highest  o.  Roughly  speaking:  general  education 
seems to be equivalent to vocational education at the next-higher level 
from a o-viewpoint. 
Finally,  we notice that the welfare sensitivity of the independent is 
markedly higher than the o of the other groups. This may be due to the 
fact  that  the  independent has, ~pending outlets in his business next to 
the usual outlets in his family household. 
4.3.  Welfare evaluation 
Table 2 suggests that the couples where both partners work (full-time 
or  part-time)  are  usually  happier  with  their  income  than  the  other 
families.  This is the reflectior~  of the fact that the natural units in these 
famiJ~es tend to be lower than in other families. 
:s:~i;sfaction with a certain income level decreases with higher educa- 
tion.  i°his stems from the fact that the reference situation of different 
education  groups is  different.  The  skilled worker may consider an in- 
come as nearly excellent, which someone with a university degree con- 
siders hardly ~ufticient. 
Finally, we notice that the average welfare evaluation of the separate 
education  groups  only  slightly  differs,  although  their  average  income 
levels show considerable differences (the income levels are not tabulated 
in  the  text).  Once  again  we  hypothesize  that  the individual's welfare 
evaluation  is  mainly  dependent on  comparison  with  the  members of 
his  social  group. 
5. A further explanation of the parameter values 
In the previous section we discussed the existence of a number of in- 
teresting and  intuitively appealing relationships between/~ and mostly 
qualitative variables.  In this section we shall attempt to explain/a, o by 
quantitative variables. 
Actually  the  number of quantitative  variables  is rather hmited. We 
may take the actual income Yi of individual i as an explanatory variable, 
since the influence of Yi  was rather strong in the tables. A second vari- 
able is the family size fs  i, not yet considered. 
A functional specification  which proved to be successful  in Belgium 
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ta  i = t3 ! ln(fs, ~ + ~32 InO'i) +/33  + e.  (6) 
It  was estimated on  the  basis of a cross-person analysis, where the data 
were provided by the sample. 
A  priori  we  may  think  the  Dutch  and  the  Belgian do not differ that 
much.  Indeed,  also here the equation (6) made sense and so we stick to 
this  specification.  Moreover,  we re:ain comparability  with  the Belgian 
results.  If the simplistic hypothes~s on which (6)  is based, that an indi- 
vidual is characterized by his income and family size is jushfied, also the 
"cross-situation"  application  of  (6)  is  legitimate,  provided  that  the 
change in y  or fs takes place under ceteris paribus conditions. 
We shall interpret ~l  and/3 2 by means of a "'cross-situation" analysis 
witlh respect to one individual. 
5.1.  The family size elasticity (3  l 
Let there  be a  relation (6)  and  let us consider a  man  with income y 
whose family size increases with  100**%. Then it is intuitively clear that 
he has to be compensated in income to retain the same welfare. 
Let us assume 132  =  0  for  the moment.  In  that  case hi,; welfare level 
was 
A(y; U, o) = N(In(y) -  U: 0, o), 
where  A  is the lognormal distribution function and N  the normal distri- 
bution function. 
If fs is increased  by a  factor ( 1 ÷ a) the effect is that the individual's 
welfare po,~ition decreases from 
to 
N(lnO') -  #l  ln(fs) -  133 ; 0, o) 
N(lnO')-/~i  ln(fs)-/33  -/3 ! ln(l  + t~); 0, o). 
Hence,  if fs increases  by a  proportion (1  +  ¢O,  income  has to be multi- 
plied  by  a  factor  (1  +  a) ~:  to  hold  the  individual's  welfare  constant. 
Hence 
/i lny 
/31  -  5 In (fs) (welfare being constant). 
We  call  ,~l I  the  constant  welfare  elasticity  of income  with  respect  to 
family size, or the family size elasticity for short. 5 2  B.M.S van Praag, A. Kapteyn. Individual welfare lunction o]'income 
5.2.  The preference drift f32 
in  the same  ~vay we can interpret t32. assuming/3 !  = O.  Let us assume 
that  the  individual  expects  an  increv.:e  of  his  income  y  by  a  factor 
(i  +  tr).  in  that case he  perceives his fature  welfare position ex ante as 
N(In0,) + In(1  + a) + ~  in(y) -13 3 ;0, o). 
However,  if the increa:;e is realized, his welfare function will adapt itself 
to the  new income level and  the new income will  be evaluated ex post 
by 
N(lnO,) + In( I + a) --/32 lnO') -/32 in( I + a) -  t3  s ; 0, o). 
Hence er ante  and  ex post  evaluation  differ,  the ex po~t evaluation be- 
ing the smaller one. The new income is evaluated ex posl' on the old wel- 
fare scale as the incomey( l + a) l!-hj instead as y( l  + ~),, The parameter 
/3  2  measures how the individual welfare function shifts to the right with 
the rise of income. We call this phenomenon the preference drift effect. 
In the measurement of/3 2 a methodological problem is involved. Prob- 
ably not every incidental  income-change  will affect  p.  Only  changes in 
income, which can be considered to be permanent are likely to influence 
p.  in  other words the prefertnce  drift  is related to permanent income. 
ttowever,  we  do  not  dispose  of  figures about  permanent income,  but 
only  of  figures  about  actual  income.  When  we consider the  actual in- 
come as a stochastic variable, with permanent income as its expectation, 
we  know  that  our estimates oft3  2 will be biased downwards {see for in- 
stance  [I,  pp.  138,  183,  184] }.  The  bias  increases  with  the variance 
of  the  stochastic  part  of  income.  On  the  other  hand,  we  feel  that 
people  will  not  give  their  actual income (who  knows exactly his own 
net  income?)  but  their  perceived  income,  which  may  be  equated  to 
"permanent  income".  We  believe  therefore  that  the  bias  of  measure- 
ment will be small, except for groups with really unstable incomes, such 
as the independent. 
Now  let  us  asst;me /31  and 13  2  are unequal  to zero.  In  that case we 
have 
lnO') -  I~ := In(y)  .... t3 ! ln(fs) -f12 In(v}-t3 3. 
In that case the family ~ize elasticiO' is B. M.S.  i~,an Praag, A.  Kapteyn, Individual wei]are function of income  5 3 
/i In(y) _  /31 
/i ln(fs)  1 -/32  (welfare being constant) 
according, to our definition. It appears that in the presence of preference 
drift the income Ay, by which the individual has to be compensated, in- 
creases,.  A  primary income compensation/3 ! (Aln(fs))  as before leads to 
a  shift  in tt of ~2"~1 (Aln(fs)).  This in  turn causes the  need  for a  sec- 
ondary  compensation  of/32 ./31(Aln(fs))  and  so  on  in order to retain 
the old welfare level. The sum of all needed compensations yields 
Aln(y) =(Bl  +iffl "#2  + ~1~  + ...) Aln(fs) = ~-S_  ~2 Aln(fs). 
However, let us assume that our individual is not compensated in money 
for a  family increase.  In that case he translates his family increase as an 
income decrease in terms of his old welfare function. His welfare evalua- 
tion changes from A(y;/a, o) into A(y;/a +/31Aln(fs), o). 
The decrease,  measured in  log-income, is only (~!  Aln(fs).  Hence we 
find  the interesting result that,  due  to the preference drift, a family al- 
lowance  has to be an overcompensation compared to the actual we, lfare 
loss in order to be satisfactory. 
Now we  present the estimated values of ~!  and/32  in (6) for the vari- 
ous classifications in  tables 4  and  5.  In  the appendix  we give the stan- 
dard  devia':ions and  R 2  of the  marginal cells. The standard  deviations  , 
are mostly small,  although there are some figures of bad quality. Tables 
4  and  5  read  as  follows.  In  a  cell  the  North-West  element  is #~l, the 
North-East element is ~2,  while the lower element is the number of ob- 
servations in the ,,ubgroup. 
5.3. Wife's activities -- education 
The  preference  drift  is  undoubtedly  maximal  in  the  group  of ex- 
tended primary education.  An income increase is  fairly quickly assimi- 
lated.  In  the extreme case of a preference drift greater than one, the in- 
dividual becomes unhappier with more income. This sound:  rather awk- 
ward  but  we  have  to stay aware of the  fact  that these estimates stem 
from cross-sections and not  from  personal interviews.  It  i.~ not 1he per- 
sonal  feeling  which  is  registered  but  a  (clinical)  observation  ~3f  facts 
about different people. Primary education and primary vocational educ- 
ation  have  a  moderate preference drift.  It is interesting to notice  that 
couples  where  the  wife  works  either  full-time  or  not  at  all  have  the 
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come  is  most  stable.  The  "permanent income" effect  hinted at in  the 
beginning of this section may cause the differences. 
The family size elasticity is increasing with education (if ~eordered as 
before').  Here it is seen  that  the working housewife is more sensitive to 
family changes than her sister without a paid job, in accordance with in- 
tuition. 
5.4.  Working environment :- education 
Table  4  shows  in  the  marginal  cells  that  the  civil  service  has  the 
largest  preference  drift (0.70},  followed  by privately employed people. 
We notice that  the  preference drift of the 35 people with extended pri- 
mary  education  in  a  non-profit  organization  is rather amazing (1.13). 
There is no pattern  in  the family size elasticity  in table 4 except for 
the fact that people with university education, especially if independent 
or not-working (students)  have a  large family size elasticity. Indeed the 
existence  of a child in such a  family may imply a  considerable loss of 
(material) welfare. 
5.5. Educat/on- lob type 
The differences ifi  preference drift as shown  in table 5 are illuminat- 
ing.  Especially the preference drift  of non-civic army  personnel with a 
vocational (i e.  military.) education  is  frightening. This may be ascribed 
.to  the fact,  that  within  the army, there  is a close  connection  between 
| 
income  and social  position.  It may be that after a  promotion  the  new 
social environment requires more additional income than  the salary in- 
crease provides. The family size elasticities are sma'.,ler than we expected, 
except  for  the  "without  profession"  group,  w~Mch consists  mainly of 
students. 
Finally, a  word about the welfare sensitivity o. As in the Belgian ex- 
perience,  it  appears  here  that  o  cannot  be  "explained"  by  In(y)  and 
ln(fs). The only factors  which seem to have sorae influence are educa- 
tion and the dichotomy, independent-employed. We list as an example 
the regression of o  on In(y) and ln(fs)  for the total sample of 3010 ob- 
servations. 
o=-0.041n(fs)+  0.061n(y)- 0.014  (R 2 =0.015L 
(0.08)  (0.00) 
The we.7,~re sensitivity seems to be genuinely individual. B. M S.  van Praag, A.  Kaptevn, Individual welfare function of income  57 
Table 6 
Main characteristics of the Dutch a~ad Belgian  surveys.* 
Belgium  The Net herlands 
Dec.  1969  S~pt.  lq71 
Sample size  2789 
Average log naturai unit (V)  3.03 
(0.43) 
Average log income 0ny)  3.20 
(0.79) 
Average welfare sensitivity  (o)  0.52 
(0.26) 
Preference drift (~2)  0.19 
(0.00) 
Family size elasticity (~t)  0.30 
(0.01) 











(0.0 i ) 
0.60 
* Between brackets the relevant estimated standard deviations have been added. 
6.  A comparison between  the Belgian and Dutch results 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction  the  present  survey  h,s  been  pre- 
ceded  by  a similar survey among the members of the Belgian Consumer 
Union  [4].  In  this section we shall compare the results of both surveys. 
In  table  6  the  main  findings  of  both  surveys  have  been,  listed.  The 
average  welfare  sensitivities  in  both  countries  do not seem 1:o differ sig- 
nificantly.  This  is in  line 'with the findiings from both surveys that tLe o 
is  "genuinely  individual",  i.e.  rather independent of personal and social 
circumstances.  In  other  words,  although  the  circumstances  between 
both countries may diffe'r considerably,  the people do not. 
The natural units show a difference which can largely be e~tplained by 
the  fact  that  /a  depends  on  the  chosen  money  unit.  In  Belgium  the 
money  unit was  10,000 B.frs. which colrresponds with about 730 Dutch 
guilders (exchange  rates of  December  1969 s),  so  we  expect  the Dutch 
(~D)  to  be  ln(730)  =  6.59  higher  than  the  Belgian  17 (VD)"  Moreover 
there is a timespan of twenty months between both surveys.  During that 
time  inflation  went  on.  Consequently  the  following  relation  will  hold: 
go  -- ~ia  + In 730 +  In a  +  % 
where  a  is  the  factor  by  which  prices  increased  during  the  twenty 
months between  both surveys and where 3' is the "real" difference. 
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Assuming  that  the  exch?nge  rate  of  December  1969  reflected  the 
ratio of purcha,;ing powers  in  both countries,  we  took the Dutch infla- 
tion rate as an estimate of a, because the chosen exchange rate was that 
of the moment of the Belgian survty. We specify therefore: 
(113.1] 
lna = In  1"-6-67.81 = 0.11 ~' , 
and  find "r =  -0.18.  In other words after correction for exchange rate 
and  inflation  the  average  natural  unit  in Belgium  is about  18% hi#~er 
than in The Netherlands. This difference has to be explained. Of course, 
our computation is rough  and  can  be critic:ized on  theoretical grounds 
as  well.  The  samples are  not representative  for  the  Dutch  and  Belgian 
populatic::s and the exchange rate is a doubtful measure to compare the 
purchasing powers of 10,000 B.frs. and  1 Dutch guilder. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to observe that the difference  between ti  D and/i B can be 
explained partly  by the corresponding difference  of the log-incomes in 
both samples. When we use a procedure siimilar to that used by the com- 
par-son of the ta's,  we find  that the Belgian average  log-income is O. 13 
higher  than  the Dutch a'-erage.  When we compare  this figure  with the 
value  of 3,(0.18),  we; may assume  that  part  .of the  differences  between 
ta B and PD  may be explained by the difference O. 13 between  the Iog-in- 
c ~mes. 
Now let us  turn to the ,,alues of the preference drift and the family 
size elasticity.  The preference  drift  in The Netherlands is three times as 
high as in Belgium. The rather striking difference between the two parts 
of th0 Low Cotmtries invites further analysis. 
The family size elasticity/31  is in Belgium considerably higher than in 
The  Netherlands.  Actually,  the  preference  drift  and  the  family  size 
elasticity can be seen as two sides of one medal. Both are a reflection of 
the  individual's  ability  to  adapt  to  varying  circumstances,  integrating 
them into his own position. 
For. the individual who smoothly accepts the changes of his situation 
caused  by  an  income  change  and  adapt,;  himself to  the  new  situation 
as normal, reacts also smoothly to a change in family size. Those people 
have  flexible standards,  i.e.,  they  take  their own circumstances as stan- 
dard. 7  So  we  may expect that an individual with rather high preference 
6  Th,.  index  number  of "ihe prices of household  consumption  in The Netherlands increased 
from  100.8 to 113  t  between Decernber  1969 and September  1971. C.B.S. Maandschrift van het 
C.B.S., maart  1972, Staatsuitgeverij, The Hague. 
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drift  has  a  small  family  size  elasticity  and  inversely.  This would  lead 
to  the  interpretation  that  the Dutch  are accepting more automatically 
change.,; in their external conditions  than their Belgian neighbors. 
Finally we compare the findings for the social classes in both coun- 
tries.  However,  the classifications differ too much  for a strict compari- 
son. Therefore, we give in table 7 only those classifications which show 
at least a slight resemblance. 
6. 1.  Wife ~ activities 
When considering "0%",  "100%"  and  "50%"  for the Belgian survey 
and  "not  at  all", "full-time" and  "part-time" for the Dutch survey as 
roughly equivalent we see that  the rankings of ~t and/32  coincide. The 
ranking of/JI  coincides partly (full-time versus remainder). 
6.2. Job  --  father 
This  classification  is  rather different  between  both  samples.  It  has 
been  given  for the sake of completeness. We note a  rather strong sim- 
ilarity  for  the skilled laborers and a dissimilarity for the agrarians and 
non-skiilled  laborers.  These last classes contain a very small number of 
observations. 
6.3.  Stability and growth/working  environment 
These  classifications have  been  listed  only  for a  comparison of the 
preference drift.  In section 5  it has been argued that for persons with a 
less stable  income,  i.e.  a  relatively small permanent income,  the mea- 
sured  preference  drift  will  tend  downwards.  From  the  viewpoint  of 
stability we rank intuitively in order of increasing instability as follows: 
civil  service,  private  enterprise,  nonprofit  organisation,  independent. 
This co~rresponds with a decrease of #2-  In the Belgian survey the stab- 
ility  of income  has  been  questioned directly. ",Ve see a  marked differ- 
ence  between  the  stable  and variable incomes, which  is completely in 
line with  the Dutch  findings. 
The overall impression of the comparison  is,  that the results of both 
surveys agree.  Especially the agreement of the average welfare sensitivi- 
ties in  both countries is striking. On  the other hand the differences be- 
tween  tthe regression coefficients seem  to be considerable. With respect 
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7. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  have  supplied  additional  ,evidence  for the following 
theses: 
( I ) The individual welfare  function is an operational concept. 
(2) it is approximately  !ognormal. 
(3) The natural unit depends on In(y) and ln(./~). 
(4)  The  coefficient  of ln(y)  estimates the preference drift. On the aver- 
age it is about 0.6 in The Netherlands. 
(5)  The  coefficient  of In(f  s)  estimates  the family  size  elasticity;  it  is 
about 0.13 in The Netherlands. 
(6) Both coefficients vary between  the social ,.;ubgroups. 
(7) The  welfare  sensitivity  does  r.ot  depend  on  income  nor  on  family 
size. There is a slight correlation  between  o and education. 
(8) The  welfare  sensitivities  in  Belgium  and The  Netherlands  are about 
equal to each other. 
Appendix 
Adjusted  correlation  coeMcients  and  standard  deviations  c,f  the  regressio,: equations  for the 
marginal classifications. 
a)Wife's ~rctivities  s.d.  ¢#] )  s.d.  (#2)  R2 
( 1 ) fuli-l:ime  0.034  0.027  0.627 
121 part-time  0.031  0.032  0.501 
(3) inci(~ental  0.052  0.042  0.507 
(4) not at all  0.018  0.015  0.601 
b) EducaJ*ion 
(1) primary education 
(2) ext.  primary education 
(3) primary vocat, educ. 
(4) seco,?~dary education 
(5) secondary vocat, educ. 
(6) higher vocat, educ. 
(7) university education 
c) Working environment 
( ! ) civil service 
(2) non-profit  organisation 
(3) private enterprise 
(4) independent 
t5) not working 
0.046  0.063  0.450 
0.027  0.032  0.594 
0.05 3  0.079  0.229 
0.~325  0.027  0.666 
0.028  0.036  0.537 
0.018  0.022  0.494 
0.028  0.024  0.631 
0.019  0.022  0.581 
0.024  0.033  0.551 
0.016  0.0 i 6  0.624 
0.(i~59  (}.05 !  0.485 
0.067  0.053  (}.545 62  RM.S. van Praag, A. Kapteyn. Individual welfare ~unction of income 
d) Job type  s.d. (flu ) 
( I ) unskilled labor 
(2) skilled iabor 
(3) administrative personnel 
¢4) lower and middle executives 
(5) non-civic army/police pets. 
(6) instructors, teachers, etc. 
(7) professional experts 
(8) the profe~sions 
(9) commercial professions 
( I 0) agrarians 
(i I) retired 
(12) "'without profession" 
(13) (temporarily) unemployed 
s.d. (~2)  R~ 
0.107  0.125  0.801 
0.037  0.064  (L287 
0.025  0.037  IIL478 
0.028  0.029  0,634 
0.086  0.095  !0!t.464 
0.027  0.034  ~.501 
0.017  0.022  (].551 
0.041  0.041  0.427 
0.041  0,048  0.574 
0.207  0. ! 08  0.808 
0.124  0.088  0,486 
0.081  0,077  0495 
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